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Collins: Federal Taxation of Alimony Arrangements

FEDERAL TAXATION OF ALIMONY ARRANGEMENTS
HENRY

D.

COLLINS*

The practicing attorney has been concerned with the Federal
Income Tax treatment accorded alimony and support arrangements
since section 117 of the Revenue Act of 19421 added, in the main,
new sections 22 (k), 23 (u) and 171 to the Internal Revenue Code.
Prior to that time it had been held that the divorced wife receiving
alimony need not include any portion of it in her taxable income
and, conversely, the alimony-paying divorced husband was allowed
no deduction.2 The Committee Report 3 stated the purpose of the
new sections in the following language:
"This section adds new sub-sections ... in order to provide
in certain cases a new income tax treatment for payments in
the nature or in lieu of alimony or an allowance for support
as between divorced or legally separated spouses. These
amendments are intended to treat such payments as income
to the spouse actually receiving or actually entitled to receive
them and to relieve the other spouse from the tax burden upon
whatever part of the amount of such payments is under the
present law includible in his gross income. In addition, the
amended sections will produce uniformity in the treatment of
amounts paid in the nature or in lieu of alimony regardless
of variance in the laws of different states concerning the
existence and continuance of ah obligation to pay alimony."
In the statutory plan devised to carry out this "new income
tax treatment", section 22 (k) specifies the conditions which must
be met in order to make the payments includible in the wife's income. Section 23 (u) permits the husband to deduct payments
which are includible under section 22 (k) in the gross income of his
wife. Section 171 provides that a divorced wife shall include in
her income the amount of trust income which she is intitled to
receive which normally would be taxable to her husband under
section 166 (income from revocable trust taxed to grantor), section
167 (taxing income from trust to grantor where that income may
be used for his benefit), or section 22 (a) under the rationale of
4
Helvering v. Clifford.
Leaving a consideration of section 171 and its correlation with
section 22 (k) until a later part of this paper, a discussion of the
* Assistant professor of law, West Virginia University.
816 (1942).
2Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151 (1917).
3H.R. Rep. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 1942-2 Cum. BuLL. 372, 409.

156 STAT.

88
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cases, categorized under the relevant Internal Revenue Code provisions of section 22 (k), should be helpful to the practitioner not
especially concerned with federal income tax matters except insofar as they affect his day-to-day practice-in this case divorce and
alimony. A sufficient number of cases have been decided, covering
such a variety of situations, during the first twelve years of the life
of the alimony provisions to provide a beacon to light the way for
the practitioner treading the tax path of alimony payments.
Admittedly the flame flickers at times and practically dies out to a
dull glow on that portion of the path marked "incident to".
A. There must be a decree of divorce or of legal separation
and payments must be received subsequent to such decree.
Voluntary payments made prior to the final decree, whether
under an oral5 or a written" separation contract are not deductible
by the husband under section 23 (u).7

Nor is a court order or

decree entered to enforce the husband's obligation under a voluntary separation agreement sufficient in itself to bring a case within
the terms of section 22 (k), for there must have been a decree of
divorce or separation and the obligation upon the husband to make
payment must have been imposed by that decree or by a written
instrument incident to such divorce or separation. Thus, where
the husband and wife, in the absence of a decree of divorce or of
separation, entered into a private separation agreement whereby
he undertook to pay the wife periodic sums for support and his
subsequent default compelled the wife to obtain a court order
to enforce payment, sums paid by the husband under that enforcement order were not deductible by him under section 23 (u).9
Payments made to the wife under a court order for separate maintenance are not deductible unless the decree of separate maintenance authorizes the wife to live apart from her husband.9 It is to
be noted that in a suit for separate maintenance under West Virginia Code 48-2-29, the court "may prohibit the husband from imposing any restraint on her personal liberty, and may free her real
and personal property from possession, control or any interest of
the husband; ....

"

This language appears to authorize the wife

to live apart from her husband, so that, provided there had been
4 309 U.S. 831 (1940).

5George D. Wick, 7 T.C. 728 (1946), aff'd, 161 F.2d 732 (3d Cir. 1947).
6Joseph D. Fox, 14 T.C. 1113 (1950).
7 Charles L. Brown, 7 T.C. 715 (1946); Smith v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d
446 (2d Cir. 1948).
8 Terrell v. Commissioner, 179 F.2d 838 (7th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340
U.S. 822 (1950).
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a final decree in the case, amounts paid under a decree of separate
maintenance in West Virginia should be deductible. However, in
practice, a final decree seldom is entered in such causes, the parties
usually being satisfied with a pendente lite order. Absent a final
decree in a West Virginia separate maintenance suit, the payments
would be in a nature of temporary or pendente lite alimony which
are not deductible by the husband nor includible by the wife. 10
In the event the payments have actually been made under a separation contract prior to the actual date of the final decree, they cannot qualify under section 22 (k) even though the final decree is
rendered nunc pro tunc to the date the payments began."
B. The payments must be "periodic" and cannot be "installment" payments of a principalsum.
Although the payments need not be made at regular intervals,
they must be "periodic" and installment payments which discharge
a part of an obligation the principal sum of which is, in terms of
money or property, specificed in the decree or instrument are not
to be considered periodic payments unless the principal sum, by
the terms of the decree or instrument, may be or is to be paid
within a period ending more than ten years from the date of the
decree or instrument.12 This provision has created four problems
for the Tax Court: (1) What constitutes specification of a principal
sum? (2) When a lump-sum is clearly specified, does it become
"periodic" because there is also provision for what are otherwise
manifestly "periodic" payments?
(3) Does payment in a lumpsum of an arrearage in "periodic payments" constitute payment of
a "principal sum"? and (4) How to measure the ten year period?
The Tax Court has found an easy solution to the first problem
of determining what constitutes specification of a principal sum.
In J. B. Steindel,13 the decree specified the payment of $100.00 per
month until the sum of $9,500.00 had been paid, unless the wife
should remarry and upon her remarriage all remaining payments
not in default were to be cancelled. The husband argued that he
had only a conditional month-to-month obligation to pay $100.00
to his wife provided she was living and not remarried, the sum of
$9,500.00 being merely a maximum limitation upon that obliga9 Frank

Kalchthaler, 7 T.C. 625 (1946).
20 George D. Wick, 7 T.C. 723 (1946), aff'd, 161 F.2d 732 (3d Cir. 1947);
Joseph A. Fields, 14 T.C. 1202 (1950), aff'd on other issue, 189 F.2d 950 (2d
Cir. 1951); Joseph D. Fox, 14 T.C. 1131 (1950); Robert A. McKinney, 16 T.C.
916 (1951).
11 Robert L. Daine, 9 T.C. 47 (1947), aff'd, 168 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1948).
12 INT. REv. CODE § 22 (k).
'3 10 T.C. 409 (1948).
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tion, and this was not an obligation to pay a principal sum such as
the statute contemplates inasmuch as the term "obligation" means
a definite, unconditional obligation in a specific sum of money. The
Tax Court found nothing in legislative history to indicate Congress
intended the word "obligation" to mean only absolute, unconditional obligations similar to that represented by a judgment and
concluded that Congress must have known that in some states the
decrees of courts rendered in divorce actions would differ as to the
degree of absoluteness and the lack of contingency in respect to the
obligation. The same principle was applied in Frank P. Orsatti
Estate,14 where the provision was for payment of $125.00 per week
for two years or until the wife remarried or until the wife died,
whichever occurred first. The Frank R. Casey 15 decree, calling
for the payment of the sum of $5,000.00 at the rate of $100.00 per
month, met the same fate, the Tax Court pointing out that there
was no material difference between a decree where the total amount
is expressly set out and one where it is necessary to multiply the
weekly payments by the number of weeks over which they are to be
paid in order to determine the principal sum specified.
However, where the alimony provision was expressed in terms
of a percentage of the husband's future income over a period of less
than ten years, the payments were deemed "periodic" because (1)
the decree provisions did not fix any total sum as a fixed sum to be
paid during the period and (2) the total payments could not be
satisfactorily calculated in advance since there was no method of
determining what the "net income" of the husband might be.' 6
The second and third circuits have disagreed with the Tax
Court's interpretation of "obligation" insofar as that interpretation
ignores the presence of contingencies, the happening of which relieve the husband from making the payments even though the
stated period of payment has not expired. In overruling the Tax
Court's determination that a principal sum had been specified "by
simple arithmetic" where the decree obligated the husband to pay
$300 per month for one year and then $200 per month for five
years unless the wife had either died or remarried before then, the
second circuit court of appeals stated in Baker v. Commissioner:'1
12 T.C. 188 (1949).
15 12 T.C. 224 (1949).
16 Roland A. Young, 10 T.C. 724 (1948)
(percentage of husband's income
over 50 month period); John H. Lee, 10 T.C. 834 (1948) (one-third of first
$12,000 of husband's income plus 25% of the excess over $12,000 for five years).
3.7205
F.2d 369, 370 (2d Cir. 1953), reversing 17 T.C. 1610 (1952).
14
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"We need not decide whether the words 'principal sum'
exclude all annuities, even those predictable actuarially, as
would be the case here if the sole contingency reducing payments were the wife's death. For here there was the further
contingency of the wife's remarriage, and no proof of any
actuarial computations in respect of such a contingency. Since
a divorced wife's remarriage-in most instances in this respect
unlike her death-depends upon some elements of her own
seemingly unpredictable choosing, the computation seems to
be as far beyond the reach of an educated guess as what will be
the first name of the man or woman who will become President
of the United States in 1883 . .. "
In Smith's Estate v. Commissioner,18 the husband was required
to pay $300 per month for five years and $100 monthly thereafter
for the life of the wife or until her marriage, but his liability
likewise ceased on his death. In refusing to read into the statute
a requirement that the terms of payment must run over ten years
in order to be a "periodic" contract, the third circuit held that
presence of three contingencies-death of husband, death of wife,
remarriage of wife-rendered the promise to pay one which could
not be mathematically calculated as a certain obligation of the
husband. Therefore, a principal sum had not been specified and
the nine $300 per month payments made by the husband during
the taxable year were properly deductible.
There was no hint in Smith's Estate as to which contingency
was considered most influential. Inasmuch as the second circuit's
Baker decision was cited as having been correctly decided, what was
said in Baker concerning the feasibility of an actuarial computation
of the contingency of the wife's death should likewise apply to
the contingency of the husband's death. Therefore, the presence
of a provision terminating the husband's liability upon his death,
or upon his wife's death, or upon the death of both, should not
prevent a mathematical computation of a principal sum in cases
of a month-to-month kind of payment plan expressly terminating
in ten years or less. The determinative contingency in such cases
is that of the wife's remarriage. Apparently that contingency
alone is sufficient to avoid specification of a principal sum in this
type of alimony plan according to the Baker-Smith's Estate rule.
Naively assuming that the husband's bargaining position with
the wife were such that he could enforce upon her such a monthto-month kind of payment plan with an expressed minus ten year
termination date, the most recent Tax Court decision on the prob18 208 F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1953).
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lem indicates that such a husband will have a very poor bargaining
position with the Commissioner. In James M. Fidler,19 the Tax
Court indicated that it would adhere to its J. B. Steindel rule
notwithstanding the fact that it has been rejected by the second
and third circuits. In the Fidler case the husband was to pay
$30,000 in monthly installments of $500.00 over a stated five-year
period and, in addition, was to pay $1,620 in monthly installments
of $300 over the same stated five-year period except that the $300
monthly installments were subject to a proportionate reduction or
elimination should the husband's income from radio contracts be
reduced or eliminated in any month during the stated period. In
finding a principal sum specified as regards the $300 monthly installments in the Fidler plan, the Tax Court took a position inconsistent with its prior view 20 which gave the "periodic" label to
payments measured by a percentage of the husband's future income.
There would seem to be as much uncertainty as to the amount of
future income in the case where a presently ascertainable income is
subject to partial reduction or total elimination by future events as
there is in the cases involving percentages of future income. Of
course the Fidler case might be distinguished from the percentageof-future-income cases on the ground that the contingency in the
former operated in the manner of a condition subsequent while
the contingency in the latter was a condition precedent. Such a
distinction based on form has no place in a tax law jurisprudence
which insists on realities and substance and takes pride in its
ability to discern the essential nature of a transaction.
When the separation agreement or the divorce decree calls for
regular month-to-month payments of equal amounts for an indefinite period and, in addition, provides for the payment of larger
sums at specific intervals limited in number to occur in ten years
or less, the courts have applied a test of "severability" to determine
whether or not these larger than ordinary payments are to be
treated as simply one of the payments in the string of payments to
be made periodically. The Webster New International Dictionary
definition of periodic as being "characterized by periods; occurring
at regular stated times; happening or appearing, at fixed intervals",
has been adopted.

Accordingly, in Ralph Norton,2 3 where the

husband was to pay the wife $200 per month until her death or remarriage and "in addition to said monthly or periodic alimony"
19 20 T.C. -,

No. 149 (1953).

20 See cases cited supra note 16.
21

16 T.C. 1216 (1951), aff'd, 192 F.2d 960 (8th Cir. 1952).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol56/iss2/3

6

Collins: Federal Taxation of Alimony Arrangements
FEDERAL TAXATION OF ALIMONY
he was to pay her forthwith $5,000 "additional alimony"
$5,000 was held not to be a periodic payment because, (1)
parties themselves did not consider it "periodic", and (2) it
"payable forthwith". However, in affirming Ralph Norton,

the
the
was
the
eighth circuit rested its decision upon the fact that the $200 per
month provision appeared in the decree while the $5,000 lump sum
provision was imposed by the voluntary written agreement between
the parties, so they were distinct and separate obligations and,
being thus separated, the $5,000 could not logically be viewed as
merely one of the recurring or periodic payments. Similarly, segregation into separate paragraphs of the separation agreement of the
obligation to pay $2,244 over a twelve month period and the obligation to pay "in lieu of alimony" $46.00 per week, enabled the
Tax Court to apply its "severability" test to determine that the
22
payment of $46.00 per week was specifically "in lieu of alimony".
The alimony plan was not "unified" but was "severable" where
one paragraph required the husband to pay $500 a month for life
and another paragraph required him to pay $45,000 in three $10,000
23
annual installments and in a final $15,000 installment
Although the courts speak in terms of contrasting a "severable"
plan with a "unified" plan, no case has been found in which payments of sums larger in amount than the regular month-to-month
uniform amount payments have been held to qualify as "periodic"
payments. It is conceivable that in the following plan all of the
payments would qualify as "periodic": Husband to pay wife $200
per month for eleven months of the year and $1,000 for the twelfth
month of the year, the payments to continue for the life of the
wife. It will be noted in the example that the $1,000 payableevery-twelfth-month provision is for a period which is not to end
or which may not end less than ten years from the date of the
decree or the written agreement. If this $1,000 yearly payment
were limited for only ten years or less, under the Tax Court test
the payments of $1,000 would not be considered "periodic".
Where the wife has received in one lump sum an arrearage of
clearly qualified "periodic" payments she has unsuccessfully contended that this was the payment of a principal sum.2 4 These
contentions have caused the courts little difficulty in view of the
22 William M. Haag, 17 T.C. 55 (1951).
23 Edward Bartsch, 18 T.C. 65 (1952), afd per curiam, 203 F.2d 715 (2d
Cir. 1953).
24 Elsie B. Gale, 13 T.C. 661 (1949), afJ'd, 191 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1951) ; Sarah
L. Narischkine Estate, 14 T.C. 1128 (1950), af'd per curiam, 189 F.2d 257 (2d
Cir. 1951); Jane C. Grant, 18 T.C. 1013 (1952), af'd, 209 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1953).
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specific section 22 (k) provision that payments may be periodic even
though they are made at irregular intervals.
If the principal sum specified in a decree or separation agreement is payable in installments or may be paid by installments within a period ending more than ten years from the date of the decree
or instrument, then, notwithstanding the specification of a principal sum, the installments are to be treated as periodic, deductible
by the husband and includible by the wife. Therefore, it becomes
important to determine how the ten year period is to be measured.
The husband and wife entered into a written separation agreement
on February 27, 1935, providing for the payment of $120,000 in
installments over a stated period. The divorce decree was signed
by the judge on February 27, 1935, but the order of divorce was
not entered until March 2, 1935. Under the particular provisions
of the agreement, if the obligation to make the payment arose only
upon the entry of the decree as an order on March 2, 1935, the ten
year plus period was not satisfied. However, if the obligation became legally binding on the date the agreement was executed or
upon the date the judge signed the decree of divorce, then the ten
year plus period was satisfied and the installments would be deductible by the husband and includible by the wife. In the case
of the wife, the seventh circuit held that the installments were includible in her income because the decree incorporated the prior
agreement and made no provision of its own for payment, thus the
obligation of the husband to make the payments arose from the
agreement and the ten year period begins to run on the date that
agreement was executed-February 27th.25 In the case of the
husband, the seventh circuit held that he could deduct the
payments because under Illinois law a judgment becomes effective
as soon as it is pronounced and not from the time it is entered as an
order, therefore, the February 27th date was determinative. 26
C. Payments must dischargea legal obligation which, because
of the marital or family relationship, is imposed upon or
incurred by husband under the divorce decree or under a
written instrument incident to such divorce or separation.
The Tax Court has been lenient in enforcing the requirement
that there be a written instrument creating the legal obligation of
the husband in the absence of provisions for alimony in the decree
25 Commissioner v. Tillie Blum, 187 F.2d 177

(7th Cir. 1950), reversing

10 T.C. 1131, cert. denied, 341 U.S. 819 (1951).
268Harry Blum v. Commissioner, 177 F.2d 670 (7th Cir. 1949), reversing
7 T.C.M. 798.
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itself. Informal correspondence between the parties prior to the
divorce wherein the husband agrees to pay for support and maintenance will suffice.2 7 So long as the separation agreement expressly28 provides for payments for the wife's support and maintenance and satisfies the controversial requirement of being "incident to" the divorce decree, it matters not that state law does not
allow alimony in an absolute divorce,2 9 nor that state law does not
impose a duty of support upon the divorced husband.30 However,
the fact that state law does provide for alimony after divorce has
been helpful in avoiding a determination that the payments called
for in the separation agreement were in reality the purchase price
of a property interest transferred by the wife.:' The legal obligation
imposed by the separation agreement and discharged by the payments provided thereunder must be the marital obligation to
support the wife and cannot be a 2contractual obligation to pur3
chase property interests of the wife.
When the obligation to make alimony payments is imposed
upon the husband by a written separation agreement rather than
by the divorce decree, it is essential that the written instrument
be "incident to such divorce or separation." The most serious
problem posed by the alimony sections of the Code has been that
of ascertaining what is meant by "incident to". On the basis of
their facts, the cases may be divided into two classes, (1) those
involving pre-divorce agreements and (2) those involving postdivorce agreements.
(1) Pre-divorce agreements. In the first class of cases the common fact is that a written separation agreement has been entered into prior to the divorce action and the problem is whether the statute
requires that one or both of the parties must have definitely
anticipated or contemplated obtaining a divorce at the time the
agreement was executed. In other words, does "incident to" mean
"in contemplation of"? If it does, must the contemplation be of
specific action or will a general contemplation suffice?
The Tax Court viewpoint insists that both parties must contemplate taking specific action to obtain a divorce at the time they
27 Floyd W. Jefferson, 13 T.C. 1092

(1949); Charles Campbell, 15 T.C. 355

(1950).

28Ben Myerson, 10 T.C. 729 (1948) (written separation agreement covered

only custody of children and made no mention of payments for wife's support).
29Tuckie G. Hess, 7 T.C. 700 (1946) (Pennsylvania law).
30 Thomas E. Hogg, 13 T.C. 361 (1949) (Texas law); Floyd H. Brown, 16
T.C. 623 (1951) (Louisiana law).
31 Julia Nathan, 19 T.C. 865 (1952).
32Frank Dubane, 10 T.C. 992 (1948).
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execute the written separation agreement. The fact that one spouse
may be considering the. possibility of a divorce is not enough to
33
make the agreement "incident to" a divorce later obtained.
Moreover, it is not sufficient that the parties considered the possibility of divorce at some unspecified time. 34 Originally this Tax
Court mutual contemplation doctrine was invoked to excuse omission from the divorce decree of any mention of the prior written
agreement. 35 So long as the requisite mutual contemplation was
present, it mattered not that nothing was said in the separation
agreement about divorce,3 6 or that the separation agreement was
not made specifically contingent upon obtaining a decree, 37 in
recognition of the danger of a charge of collusion. Because of the
Tax Court contemplation rule, a plausible explanation must be
offered where a long interval of time elapses between the date of
the agreement and the date of the decree. 3 However, the fact that
the separation agreement provides that it might be incorporated
into any subsequent divorce decree obtained will not suffice to show
the presence of the requisite contemplation where there is evidence
that the wife consistently refused either to obtain a divorce or to
consent to husband's obtaining one. 39
The circuit4° and district4l courts have been unanimous in
their rejection of the Tax Court's contemplation test in cases of
pre-divorce separation agreements. Reasons assigned for the rejection of the contemplation test are three-fold: (1) it posed a
dilemma for attorneys in states where the divorce might be voided
by collusion; (2) a party's state of mind during periods of emotional
stress attendant upon the break-up of a marriage is not generally
subject' to objective proof, and (3) the term "written instrument
incident to such divorce" was designed only to insure proof of the
33Cecil A. Miller, 16 T.C. 1010 (1951), rev'd 199 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1952).
34 George J. Feinberg, 16 T.C. 1485 (1951), reted 198 F.2d 260 (3d Cir. 1952).
3
5Jessie L. Fry, 13 T.C. 658 (1949).
38 Robert W. Johnson, 10 T.C. 647 (1948).
37 George T. Brady, 10 T.C. 1192 (1948).
38 George T. Brady, 10 T.C. 1192 (1948) (lawyers were busy and unable to
secure necessary documents); Bertram G. Zilmer, 16 T.C. 365 (1951) (eighteen
months' time interval explainable where husband did not have sufficient funds
to finance an immediate divorce action); Jessie L. Fry, 13 T.C. 658 (1949) (two
year interval because wife reneged on original promise to secure immediate
divorce).
30 Florence B. Moses, 18 T.C. 1020 (1952).
40 Israstzoff v. Commissioner, 193 F.2d 625 (2d Cir. 1952), affirming 15 T.C.
573 (1950); Lerner v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1952), reversing 15
T.C. 379 (1950); Feinberg v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 260 (3d Cir. 1952), reversing
16 T.C. 1485 (1951); Commissioner v. Miller, 199 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1952),
reversing
16 T.C. 1010 (1951).
4
1Stewart v. Rothensies, 114 F. Supp. 497 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
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existence of the obligation when divorce has occurred.4 2 Other
reasons, unstated, but equally compelling, are: (1) a divorced wife,
as an interested party, might well be tempted to perjure herself
because of the tax savings enuring to her from a finding that she
had not contemplated divorce at the time she signed the separation
agreement; and (2) interspousal income splitting has been permitted since 1948, so there is no longer need to guard against attempts
to shift income between spouses. Logical as these reasons for nonrecognition of the contemplation test may be, the Tax Court has
recently indicated an intention to continue applying it.43
(2) Post-divorce agreements. When the husband enters into
a post-divorce agreement, can he be said to be discharging a legal
obligation arising from the marital or family relationship when the
support obligation has already once been satisfied by a pre-decree
agreement or by provisions of the divorce decree? Can there be
any legal obligation arising from the marital or family relationship
remaining once a valid divorce decree is entered which makes no
provisions for alimony and there has been no pre-divorce agreement
on the matter? These are the problems facing the courts in cases
of post-divorce agreements. Here the case language is more apt
to emphasize the "legal obligation" approach rather than the
"incident to" approach.
The Tax Court, supported by the court of appeals for the
District of Columbia and the third circuit court of appeals, takes
the firm stand that the phrase "written instrument incident to such
divorce" should be read "written instrument incident to such divorce decree" rather than "written instrument incident to such
divorce status" (italicized words added). Accordingly, increased
payments made to the wife under a post-divorce agreement, the
pre-divorce agreement not having been incorporated into the decree
and no jurisdiction having been retained by the divorce court,
were not deductible by the husband.44 Nor can a post-divorce
modification of a pre-divorce agreement not incorporated into the
decree be "incident to" the divorce, especially when the modifying
4
post-divorce agreement is executed fourteen years after the decree. 5
Where there was no pre-divorce agreement and no provision in
the decree for alimony, a post-divorce agreement made seven
Lerner v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1952), reversing 15 T.C.
(1950).
B. Moses, 18 T.C. 1020 (1952).
4Florence
44 Frederick S. Dauwalter, 9 T.C. 580 (1947).
45 Walsh v. Commissioner, 183 F.2d 803 (D.C. Cir. 1950), affirming I1 T.C.
42

379

1093 (1948).
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months later to preserve the divorced status by dissuading the wife
from collaterally attacking the divorce is not "incident to" such
divorce inasmuch as the divorce terminated his marital obligation.46
Under these cases the fact that the parties have the status of being
divorced at the time the post-divorce agreement is executed is insufficient to make that agreement "incident to the divorce", "such
divorce" being interpreted to mean "such divorce decree".
There are strong intimations in the language of decisions in
the second and first circuits and the court of claims that "incident
to such divorce" may indeed mean "incident to such divorce status".
Although finding that the decretal obligation to support survived
the private post-divorce modification under state law, the second
circuit was "not prepared to say" that the phrase "incident to such
divorce" should be read as "incident to such divorce decree" in
Commissioner v. Murray.47 There the wife was unable to prove
that she had received payments under the private post-divorce
agreement in excess of those provided in the decree and since the
decree was still a legally enforceable obligation of the husband, payments made by him, to the extent of the amount specified in the
decree, were includible in her income under section 22 (k).
In Smith v. Commissioner s the first circuit felt "that in view
of the purpose of section 22 (k) to secure tax uniformity irrespective
of variances in state laws .

.

. there is much to be said for reading

the phrase 'written instrument incident to such divorce' as referring
to the continuing status of the legal obligation to support the
divorced spouse." In Smith the pre-divorce agreement specifically
left open the final settlement of the support question and was incorporated in that form into the decree. Thus the decree, too, left
open until a later time the final settlement of the support question.
Accordingly, when six years later the parties negotiated a final
settlement of the alimony question pending an appeal by the
husband for alimony reduction and had the husband's appeal
dismissed under a final decree eliminating alimony in view of the
wife's acceptance of the settlement, the court logically found that
the origin or motive for the post-divorce agreement could be traced
to no other obligation than the one arising from a family or marital
relationship. Similarly, in DuPont v. United States,49 where the
divorce court had continuing jurisdiction in the sense that it had
46

(1948).
47
48

49

Cox v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 226 (3d Cir. 1949), affirming 10 T.C. 955
174 F.2d 816 (2d Cir. 1949), affirming 7 T.C.M. 365.
192 F.2d 841 (1st Cir. 1951), affirming 16 T.C. 639 (1951).
104 F. Supp. 978 (Ct. C1. 1952).
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power to annul its alimony provisions on the ground of false
representation, a post-divorce compromise agreement executed to
forestall the possibility that the wife would seek an annulment
of the decree on that ground is a written agreement incident to the
original divorce decree.
It is to be noted that the Smith and DuPont cases, the outstanding examples recognizing post-divorce agreements, involved
situations where (1) the husband was still under a legal obligation
of support at the time he made the post-divorce modifying agreement and (2) the divorce court still had jurisdiction of the divorce
action, either expressly or through power to modify because of
fraud. These circumstances may limit the scope of recognition
which will be given to post-divorce agreements under section 22 (k).
One writer- o and a district court 51 have characterized the Smith
and Murray cases as indicating the trend of decisions is headed to
a holding that "any revision will satisfy the legal obligation requirement if the original agreement was executed while a legal obliga.
tion to support existed." Another writer 52 feels that the acceptance
of the Smith approach will mean that "any post-divorce agreement
for the separate maintenance of the wife executed while the
husband is still obligated to support will be considered incident
to the divorce, irrespective of whether the divorce decree is modified to incorporate the agreement."
In its very latest decision on the subject, the Tax Court has
indicated that it will now recognize payments made under a postdivorce revision of a pre-divorce contract even though the predivorce contract was not enforceable under state law because not
incorporated into the decree.52a Since this post-divorce contract
was a revision of the original agreement executed while the parties
were still married with the husband under the legal obligation of
support, this decision appears to be the holding prophesied from an
analysis of the trend of decisions by the court and writers as out.
lined in the preceding paragraph.
D. Support of minor children.
Section 22 (k) does not apply to that part of the periodic payment which the terms of the decree or written instrument fix, in
terms of an amount of money or a portion of the payment, as a
sum which is payable for the support of minor children of the
50 Comment, 61 YALE L.J. 1200 (1952).
51 Newton v. Pedrick, 115 F. Supp. 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
52 Baum, What Is "Incident" to a Divorce: The Problem of Section 22 (k),
N.Y.U. TWELFTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION 508, at 521 (1953).
52a Raoul Walsh, 21 T.C. -,
No. 120 (March 31, 1954), CCH Dec. 20, 239.
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husband. In the event any periodic payment is less than total
amount specified in the decree or written instrument, it is to be
applied first to the satisfaction of the sum payable for the support
of the minor children. In other words, the husband is not entitled
to deduct, nor is the wife required to include in her income, that
portion of the periodic payment which the decree or agreement
specifies to be payable for support of minor children, partial
payments being applied first against the amount specified for support of minor children.
As might be imagined the cases all deal with the question,
What amounts to specification of a sum payable for support of
minor children? Here again the test is couched in terms of "severability", that is, construing the agreement or decree as a whole,
reading each paragraph in the light of the other paragraphs, can
it be said that any amount, in terms of dollars or portions, is
"allocable" to child support and thus "severable" 'from the payments for the wife's support and maintenance?
If no allocable amount is specified for child support, the fact
that the wife did not want any part of it for herself and actually
used it all for the children is immaterial. 53 Provisions for reduction (in dollars, fractions or percentages) of the lump sum monthly
payment upon the death54 or remarriage 5 of the wife or upon the
deaths6 of a child or upon the child's obtaining majority57 constitute sufficient specification of child support payments. Absent
the requisite specification in the original decree, amendments
nunc pro tunc cannot have retroactive effect. 58
Even though the decree specifies a "severable" sum for child
support, the husband must still prove that he supplied over onehalf of the actual cost of support in order to be entitled to an
exemption for the child.59 However, the fact that support money
is not actually used for the child's support is immaterial so long
as the husband's child support payment is in excess of one-half
of the actual cost of such support.65
5 Dora H. Moitoret, 7 T.C. 640 (1946.)
54 Warren Leslie, Jr., 10 T.C. 807 (1948).

55 Robert W. Budd, 7 T.C. 413 (1946), aff'd, 177 F.2d 198 (6th Cir. 1947).
56 Harold M. Fleming, 14 T.C. 1308 (1950); Mandel v. Commissioner, 185
F.2d 50 (7th Cir. 1950).
57 Robert W. Budd, supra note 56.
5sEdna M. Gilbertson, 10 T.C.M. 594 (1951).
59 See Donald A. Hansaker, 11 T.C.M. 1184 (1952). In the vast majority of

cases the husband is unable to prove the total cost of support because that
information is possessed by an adverse party-the wife who likewise desires to
use the dependency exemption.

GOI.T. 3883, 47-2 GuM. BULL. 38.
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E. Alimony payments from property transferred (in trust or
otherwise) in discharge of legal obligation imposed upon
or incurred by husband under decree or "incident" written
instrument.
Often an alimony plan will provide a definite source for the
periodic payments by requiring that the husband transfer an income-producing property either directly to the wife, or in trust
for the wife. On the other hand, long prior to the divorce, either
as part of the ante-nuptial agreement or otherwise, the husband
may have created a trust for the benefit of the wife or assigned a
beneficial interest to her; and when the marriage ends up in
divorce proceedings no provisions are made in the decree or in the
written separation agreement concerning alimony because it is
felt the previously created trust or assigned beneficial interest will
continue to supply the wife with sufficient income for her support.
Section 22 (k) covers the former situation and section 171 covers
the latter situation.
Section 22 (k) will always apply when a transfer of property
is made, or a trust is originally created, or an assignment of a
beneficial interest in a previously created trust is made, to discharge
the legal support obligation specified in the decree or "incident"
written instrument."' Section 22 (k) also covers previously created
trusts or previously assigned beneficial interests if payments to the
wife under the trust continue in discharge of the legal support
02
obligation specified in the decree or "incident" written instrument.
Section 171 can never apply to any trust to which section 22 (k) is
applicable."3 Accordingly, section 171 is usually applicable to trusts
in which the divorced wife has a beneficial interest derived from
the husband where there is no legal obligation of support imposed
upon the husband by the decree or "incident" written instrument
and the trust was not created, nor the assignment of a beneficial
interest to the wife made, in contemplation of divorce.
If either section 22 (k) or 171 is applicable to the trust, the
trust income is includible in the divorced wife's income and excludible from the husband's income even though the husband would
otherwise ordinarily be taxable on the trust income either. because
(1) he retains a power to revoke, 4 or (2) he retains an interest in the

61 U.S. Treas. Reg. 118 § 39.22 (k)-l.
62 U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.22 (k)-l, Example (3).
03 U.S. Treas. Reg. 118 § 39.171-1.
64INT. REv. CODE § 166.
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trust income, 65 or (3) he retains a control over the trust so complete
that he is still in practical effect the owner of its income. 6 However,
the chief distinction between the application of sections 22 (k) and
171 to the alimony trust lies in the fact that if section 22 (k) is
applicable the wife must include in her income the full amount
of periodic payments received attributable to the property in trust,
whether or not out of trust income. 67 On the other hand, section
171 requires amounts paid, credited or to be distributed to her to
be included in her income only to the extent such amounts are
out of income of the trust for its taxable year. 68 Therefore, if
section 22 (k) is applicable a distribution of trust corpus to the
wife in the form of a periodic payment would be taxable income
to her.
Insofar as the trust instrument or decree fixes in terms of an
amount of money or a portion of trust income, a sum which is
payable for support of minor children of the husband, neither
section 22 (k) nor 171 is applicable to such amounts of trust income. 9 The wife will not include such sums in her income and
the husband usually must include such sums in his income under
section 167.
The chief advantage in using the alimony trust arises from the
the fact that the husband can retain a great deal of control over
the trust res during the life of the wife and recover it entirely
upon her death without being taxed on the trust income in the
interval. Therefore, the trust device is preferable in situations
where an out and out transfer of assets in a lump sum settlement
would deprive the husband of some economic advantage, other than
the receipt of direct income, growing out of ownership of the assets.
The most common example is controlling stock in a closed corporation.
F. Miscellaneous matters.
(1) Life insurance in alimony arrangements. Often the alimony plan involves an assignment of existing life insurance policies
to the wife. Two tax questions arise from such an arrangement.
(1) Can the husband deduct, and must the wife include, amounts
thereafter paid by the husband in the form of insurance premiums?
(2) Will the wife be taxed upon the proceeds of the assigned policy?

65 INT.

REV. CODE § 167.
66 U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.22 (a)-21. (The Clifford regulations).
67 U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.171-1.
6s Supra note 67.
69 INT. REV. CODE §§ 22 (k) and 171 (a).
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In order that the insurance premiums paid by the husband be
entitled to the classification of "periodic payment", it is essential
that the policy be absolutely assigned to the wife and that she be
irrevocably designated as primary beneficiary.70 If it is possible
to interpret the assignment of the policy as being only security for
the payment of alimony, the premiums paid are not "periodic payments". 71 If the decree prohibits the husband from changing,
at any .future time (emphasis added), the designation of the wife
7
as primary beneficiary, then premium payments are deductible. 2
However, if the restriction on change of beneficiary is to continue
only during the wife's life so that the husband would regain full
possession and control of the policy in the event she predeceased
him, the premium payments are not deductible by the husband inasmuch as they are not paid for the sole benefit of the divorced
73
wife.
The proceeds of a life insurance contract paid by reason of
4
the death of the insured are exempt from federal income taxes,
unless there has been an assignment of the policy for a valuable
consideration. 75 Accordingly, although there are no cases, insofar
as the wife accepts the irrevocable assignment of the policy in
divorce proceedings in consideration of her release of the marital
rights of support, she should be taxed on the proceeds of the policy.
This result can be avoided by taking out a new policy rather than
assigning existing policies if age, cost and other factors permit.
(2) Deductibility of legal expenses. The original Treasury
viewpoint disallowed a deduction for legal fees paid either to secure
alimony or to resist an attempt to secure alimony.70 The cases
have denied a deduction for attorney fees paid by the wife to secure
the divorce, 77 but have permitted her to deduct legal fees paid to
stcure a lump sum settlement of periodic payments78 or to secure
an increase in alimony for both past and future years.7" The
husband cannot deduct legal fees paid in defending the wife's suit
to collect alimony arrearages, for the payment is not ordinarily
I.T. 4001, 1950-1 CuM. BULL. 27; Anita Quimby Stewart, 9 T.C. 195 (1947).
71 Lemuel A. Carmichael, 14 T.C. 1356 (1950); Blumenthal v. Commissioner,
183 F.2d 15 (3d Cir. 1950).
72 Lemuel A. Carmichael, 14 T.C. 1356 (1950).
73Smith's Estate, 11 T.C.M. 1167 (1953)
70

74 INT. REV. CODE
75 INT. REv. CODE

§
§

22 (b) (1).
22 (b) (2).

76 I.T. 3856, 1947-1 CuM. BULL.
77 Barbara B. Lemond, 13 T.C.
78

23.
670 (1949).

Supra note 77.

Elsie B. Gale, 13 T.C. 661 (1949), affd, 191 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1951). The
Treasury has accepted the decision. See Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.23 (a)-l.
79
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related to a business activity.s 0 Nor is it material that under state
law the wife could have sequestered his property to secure her
demand for arrearages.8s However, where there was a showing that
part of the legal fee paid by the husband in connection with a
separation agreement was allocable to successful compromise of a
claim made by the wife which would have caused the husband to
lose control of property from which he derived his income, deduction of such allocable part of the fee was permissible under section
23 (a) (2) as an expense incurred for the management, conservation
or maintenance of property held for the production of taxable
income.8 2
G.

Internal Revenue Code of 1954.

As of the date this article was written, the House of Representatives had passed its version of the Internal Revenue Code .of
1954.83 Section 71 of the H.R. 8300 generally corresponds to section 22 (k) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 except for the
insertion of the following paragraph:
"If a wife is separated from her husband and there is a written
separation agreement, the wife's gross income includes periodic
payments (whether or not made at regular intervals) received
after such agreement is executed which are made under such
agreement and because of the marital or family relationship
(or which are attributable to property transferred, in trust or
otherwise, under such agreement and because of such relationship). This paragraph shall not apply if the husband and
wife make a single return jointly."
The Committee Report finds8 4 that present treatment discrim-

inates against husbands and wives who have separated although
not under a court decree and states"5 that no substantive change,
except for that contained in the quoted paragraph, has been made
in the 1939 Code section 22 (k) provision.
If the Senate accepts the House version of new section 71, the
uncertainties concerning pre-divorce agreements should disappear.
The "contemplation" test will no longer be needed. The new Tax
Court view s " on post-divorce revisions of pre-divorce agreements
will do much to free post-divorce agreements from tax litigation.
so Lindsay C. Howard, 16 T.C. 157 (1951), aff'd, 202 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1953).
81 Thorne Donnelley, 16 T.C. 1196 (1951).

82 Baer v. Commissioner, 196 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1952), reversing 16 T.C.
1418 (1951).
83 H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
84 H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 10.
85 H.R. REP. No. 1337, Detailed Discussion of The Technical Provisions of
The Bill, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., A20.
BG
Supra note 52a.
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However, absent a pre-divorce contract or a decreed support
obligation, it is doubtful if a post-divorce agreement will qualify
without further statutory modification. Cox v. Commissioner",
should remain good law in this respect.
Future tax litigation in the alimony area can be expected in
the main to be limited to purely interpretative decisions in the
"periodic versus installment" and "child support" fields and to
clarifying determinations of the effect of contingencies upon the
specification of a principal sum.
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